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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.2
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.s
AGENT.
Notice of his.Authority.-A party dealing with. al agent for a special
purpose must ascertain at his own peril the agent's power. And where
an agent's contract to sell land at a fixed price has been approved by the
principal, the purchaser has no right to infer from that fact that the
agent has power to alter the terms of the contract: The National Iron
Armor Company v. Bruner, 4 C. E. Green.
An agent with restricted power to sell a tract of land at a given price,
has no. power to bind his principal by any representation as to the quan-
tity or quality of the land. Such representations, if false, may avoid
the contract: Id
-ARBITRATION AND AWARD.
Government Claims.-An Act of Congress referring a claim against
the government to an officer of one of the executive departments to exa-
mine and adjust, does-not, even though the claimant and government act
under the statute and the account is examined and adjusted, make the
case one of arbitrament and award in the technical sense of these words,
and so as to bind either party as by submission to award: Gordon v.
United States, 7 Wall.
Hence, a subsequent act repealing the one making the reference (the
claim not being yet paid) impairs no right and is valid. DeGroot v.
United States, 5 Wall. 432, affirmed: Id.
Semble, that the court does not sanction the allowance of interest on
claims against the government: Id.
ATTORNEY.
Privileged Communication.-.-An agreement made in the presence of
an attorney between his client and a third person, is not a privileged
communication: Carr v. Weld, 4 C. E. Green.
CHARITABLE USES.
04'ect of the Statute.-The object of the statute of charitable uses in
England was not to restrain gifts to such uses, but to enforce and make
valid such gifts in certain cases in which they had before been held void
because the object was too vague and indefinite: NAorri et al. v. Thom-
son's Ex'rs. et al., 4 C. E.. Green.
The statute of charitable uses has never been enacted in this state.
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 7 Wall. Rep.
2 From J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 28 Md. Rep.
3 From C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear il 4 C. E. Green's Rep.
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and therefore English decisions founded upon its provisions may not be
of authority here, but such as declare gifts void on account of the
objects being too vague and indefinite upon principles adopted as part
of the common law before the statute, should be regarded: Id.
A power of appointment given to one by a will to give or devise cer-
tain property among such benevolent, religious, or charitable institutions
as he may think proper, is void because so vague and indefinite that. it
cannot be enforced. And the defect in this case would not be aided in
England by the statute of charitable uses: Id.
Where a power to dispose of property is conferred upon a person to
whom a life estate or some other interest in it is given, this is a power
in gross and can be relinquished or surrendered, but where such power
is given to one who has no interest in the property it is a power simply
collateral and cannot be surrendered: Id.
An act of the legislature which in a particular case authorizes the
surrender of such power when simply collateral, or confirms such sur-
render when made, is constitutional and valid; it divests or takes away
no vested or settled rights: Td.
hange in. Name and other Partculars of Corporation Trustee.-
Where a testator devises the income of property in trust primarily for
one-object, and if the income is greater than that object needs, the sur-
plus to others (secondary ones), a bill in the nature of a bill quia timet,
and in anticipation of an incapacity in the trusts to be executed here-
after, and when a surplus arises (there being no surplus now, nor the
prospect of any), will not lie by heirs at law (supposing them otherwise
entitled, which here they were decided not to be), to have this surplus
appropriated to them on the ground of the secondary trusts having, sub-
sequently to the testator's death, become incapable of execution: Girard
v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall.
Neither the identity of a municipal corporation, nor its right to hold
property devised by it, is destroyed by a change of its name, an enlarge-
ment of its area, or an increase in the number of its corporators. And
these are changes which the legislature has power to make: Id.
Ex. gr. : A city having the name of "The Mayor, Aldermen, and
Citizens of Philadelphia," covered two square miles, was surrounded by
twenty-eight incorporated municipalities, more populous than itself, and
which, with it, covered a hundred and twenty-nine miles square, and
made the county of Philadelphia. An Act of Assembly enacted that
the- name above given should be changed to "The City of Philadelphia."
and the boundaries of the said city extended so as embrace the whole
territory of the county, and that all the powers of the said corporation,
as enjarged and modified by the act, should be exercised and have effect
within the said county, and over the inhabitants thbreof. The act also
consolidated the aggregated debt of all the corporations and made it the
debt of the new city, and largely extended and changed the organization
of the old city.
Hcd, tbat the original corporation was not destroyed, and (the con-
solidating act having declared that all the estates held by any of the
corporations affected by the act should be held "upon and for the same
uses, trusts, limitations, charities, and conditions as the same were then
held") that the new city had every capacity to take and hold, and
every power to execute trusts which were possessed by the old one: Id.
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Under the will of Stephen Girard (for the terms of which see the case
in full in 7 Wallace) the whole final residuary part of his estate was left
to the old city of Philadelphia, in trust, to apply the income:-
i. For the maintenance and improvement of his college as a primary
object, and after that to enable the corporation,
ii. To improve its police.
iii. To improve the city property and the general appearance of the
city, and to diminish the burden of taxation.
The court having declared that so long as any portion of the income
should be found necessary for improvement and maintenance of the col-
lege, the second and third objects could claim nothing, and the whole
income being, in fact, necessary for the college --
Held-i. That no question arose at this time as to whether the new
city should apply the surplus under the trusts for the secondary objects
to the benefit of the new city, or to that portion of it alone embraced in
the limits of the old one.
ii. That whether or not the trusts being, as was decided in Vidal x.
Girard, 2 Howard 127, in themselves valid, Girard's heirs could not
inquire or contest the right of the city corporation to take the property
or to execute the trust; this right belonging to the state alone as
yarens yatrixe: Id.
CdNFLIcT or LAWS. See Co7poration.
Law of Domicil and of Situs.-A., B., and C., were residents and
citizens of New York. A. being indebted to both B. and C., and hav-
ing certain chattels personal in Illinois, mortgaged them to B. Two
days afterwards, and before the mortgage could be recorded in Illinois,
or the property be delivered there-both record and delivery being
necessary by the laws of Illinois, though not by those of New York, to
the validity of the mortgage as against third parties-C. issued an
attachment, a proceeding in ren., out of one of the courts of Illinois,
and, under its laws, in due form, levied on and sold the property. B.
did not make himself a party to this suit in attachment, though he had
notice of it, and,'by the laws of Illinois, a right to take defence to it;
but after its termination, brought suit inNew York against C. for taking
and converting the chattels. C. pleaded in bar the proceedings in
attachment in Illinois. The New York courts-holding that the only
question was B.'s property in the chattels on the day of the attachment;
that the existence or non-existence of such property was to be decided
by the law of the domicil of the parties, to wit, New York; and finally
that by this law the property was complete in B. on the execution of the
mortgage-adjudged, that the proceedings in attachment in Illinois were
not a bar. But,
Held, by this court, that by such judgment the "full faith and credit"
required by the Federal Constitution had not been given in the state of
New York to the judicial proceedings of the state of Illinois: and that
so the judgment below was erroneous: Green. v. Tan Bi ucirk, 7 Wall.
The fiction of law that the domicil of the owner draws to it his per-
sonal estate wherever it' may happen to be, yields whenever, for the
purposes of justice, the actual situs of the property should be examined:
Id.
By the laws of Illinois an attachment on personal property there, will
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take precedence of an unrecorded mortgage executed in another state
where record is not necessary, though both the owner of the chattels,
the attaching creditor, and the mortgage creditor are residents of such
other state: _i.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Conflict of Laws.
Rigt to sue in United States Courts.-The constitutional right of
citizens of one state to sue, in the Federal courts, citizens of another
(within which right comes that of citizens of one state to sue a muni-
cipal corporation chartered by another and where the corporators are all
citizens of that other) cannot be defeated by statutory limitation: Cowles
v. Mercer Co., 7 Wall.
CORPOR4TION.
Lex loci coutractus-The rule of Cornity-How Foreign Laws are to
l,e prored.-A corporation can have no legal existence, out of the bound-
aries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists by force of
the law; and where that ceases to- operate and is no longer obligatory.
the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of
its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty. But while it
must live and have its being in that state only, there is no insuperable
objection to its power of contracting in another. Being an artificial
person, it may, like natural persons, through the intervention of agents,
make contracts within the scope of its limited powers in a state where it
does not reside; provided such contracts are permitted to be made by
the laws of the place: B. and 0. Railroad Co. v. Glenn, 28 Md.
Corporations, unlike natural persons, cannot change their domicil;
they have a stationary habitation, and can only have transactions away
from their home through their agents: Id.
Where a corporation derives its charter from the state of Virginia
alone, its domicil is in that state exclusively. It cannot*reside here and
in Virginia at the same time under the one charter: d.
The validity of a deed made by a corporation created by the laws of
Virginia, must be determined by the laws of that state; if it be legal
there it is so here, unless it violates good morals, or is repugnant to some
law or policy of this state. If it be fraudulent and void according to
the laws of Virginia, the fraud attaches to it here, and vitiates it: Id.
It is a general principle, admitting of few exceptions, that in con-
struing contracts made in a foreign country, the courts are governed by
the lex loci, as to the essence of the contract; that is, the rights acquired
and the obligations created by 
it: Id.
The rule of comity adopts the law of the country where the contract
is made, in determining its nature, construction, and ,alidity, unless such
construction is contra bonos mores, or against some positive law of the
place where the contract is sought to be enforced: Id.
No right can be derived under any contract made in express opposi-
tion to the laws of the place in which such contract is made: Id.
An assignment of personal property within our limits belonging to
parties abroad, may be made according to the foreign law, where our own
citizens, in assigning similar property, are required to conform to our
laws regulating such assignment: Id.
The unwritten law of a foreign country is a fact to be pr6-d; as
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other facts, by the testimony of experts; the statutory law, by the law
itself, or an exemplified copy: Id.
COURTS.
Statutory Jurisdiction-Judical Sales when called in question col-
laterally.-Where special and extraordinary powers are given by statute
to a court in relation to a subject-matter, of which such court had no
jurisdiction independent of the statutd, all the requisites of the statute
must be strictly complied with, to render the exercise of the powers so
given valid: Cockey v. Cole, 28 Md.
Where a cour t has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question
which occurs in the cause; and whether its decision. be correct or not,
its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other
court. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are
regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and
form no bar to a recovery sought in opposition to them, even prior to a
reversal: Id.
Sales ratified by a court having jurisdiction, when collaterally called
in question, should be upheld by every legal intendment. And if errors
and irregularities exist, they are to be corrected by some direct proceed-
ing, either before the same or an appellate court: Id,
COURT OF CLAIMS. See Revenue Laws.'
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Wearing Apparel.-A lace shawl is wearing apparel and exempt -from
execution. Whether it is, of greater value than the owner ought to
wear in her condition in life as to property, cannot be inquired into,
where it was bought for her use before judgment or claim against her:
Frazier and Tl'fe v. Barnum, 4 C. E. Green.
Rings and jewelry are not wearing apparel and are liable for debt, and
as it may be out of the power of the sheriff to levy on or take posses-
sion of them, being usually worn on the person, a receiver will be
appointed and an* order made for their delivery to him: Id.
An assignment of an annuity, though -due from parties and properties
out of the jurisdiction of this court, made by the person to whom it
belongs to a receiver here under the direction of this court, is good, and
would enable the receiver to collect it in a foreign state. But where the
fund held iu trust for the debtor has proceeded from some person other
than the debtor himself, it is exempt: Id.
Fraudulent Sale.-A sale, far below value, of a railroad with its
franchises, rolling-stock, &c., under a decree of foreclosure, set aside as
fraudulent against creditors; the sale having been made under a scheme
between the directors of the road and the purchasers, by which the
directors escaped liability on endorsements which they had made for
the railroad company. And the purchasers held to be trustees to the
creditors' complainant, for the full value of the property purchased, less
a sum which the purchasers had actually paid for a large lien claim pre-
sented as for its apparent amount, but which they had bought at a large
discount. Interest on the balance from the day of purchase to the day
of final decree in the suit to be added: Drury v. Cross, 7 Wall.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
But because the full value of the property sold was not shown with
sufficient certainty, the case was sent back for ascertainment of it by a
master: 17L.
EASEMENT.
Title by Time-liMl-Dam.-The courts of this state have, by analogy
to the statute relating to title to other real property, adopted twenty years
as the term for acquiring an easement by enjoyment. The adverse
enjoyment must have been continuous and to the full extent for the -
whole of the time: Carlisle and Others v. Cooper, 4 0. E. Green.
In case of a dam, the easement acquired is not the right of maintain-
ing a dam or structure upon the land of the party himself; but the right
to flow back the water on the land of his neighbor. His neighbor has
no right of action for the mere building of the dam, unless it throws the
water back upon his land; his suffering it is no acquiescence in anything
from which a grant or permission can be presumed: Id.
No one is bound to measure the dam of an adjoining proprietor, and
employ an engineer to calculate whether, if kept tight and full, it will
throw water upon him. But when it does throw water upon him, if he
permits it for twenty years a grant will be presumed. But this only to
the extent to which his land was habitually or usually overflowed: Id.
The rule is that any interruption of enjoyment during the acquisition
of an easement that is within the twenty years, will defeat the acquisi-
tion. After the acquisition is complete, no interruption or cessation,
ezcept for twenty years, or with a plain intention to abandon, will destroy
the easement: Id.
Where the dam is a permanent structure, it is not necessary that the
water should be kept constantly in it to its full capacity, nor that it should
be always kept in perfect repair; it is the height of the water as ordi-
narily kept in the dam, when kept in repair as dams are kept for profit-
able and economical use, that will fix the height acquired by prescrip-
tion. If a dam is permitted for one or more years to be out of repair so
as not to injure the land above it, that time will not be counted in the
prescription; the prescription is interrupted and must commence anew:
Id.
This rule must apply only to such dams as are permanent, and to such
gates and movable parts as are constantly used and kept in their places
to raise the height of the water. Boards or gates that are only used
in seasons of low water, so as to increase the water in a mill-pond, with-
out overflowing the lands above, and used at intervals only, cannot gain
the right to keep the dam at the height to which they raise it, if that
will make the level of the water upon the lands of the upper proprietor
higher than maintained for twenty years: Id.
When an easement to flow water is claimed by adverse enjoyment the
whole burden of proof is on the claimant: Id.
EQUITY.
Sales under a. Decree-Vacation of Sales-Substitution of Pur-
chaser.-A sale under a decree of a court of equity should not be
vacated and set aside for causes that the parties interested might, with
reasonable diligence and effort, have obviated. Eveiy intendment will
be made to support such a sale; and it is only where the court can see
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that injustice will be done by the ratification of a sale, to a party not in
default, that it will interfere to prevent it: Farmers' Bank of Ma7yland
v. Clarke, 28 Md.
A sale boa fide made, will not be set aside because of a diversity of
opinion among witnesses as to the value of the property, unless it appear
that the price reported is so grossly inadequate, as to do injury to parties
not in default: Id.
The ratification or rejection of a sale under a decree in equity, must
depend on the state of facts' existing .at its date, and not on subsequent
events. As the- purchaser is made to bear all loss by depreciation sub-
sequent to the time of sale, he should be entitled to all profit that he may
be able to make of the property afte that time: Id.
A court of equity will allow the substitution of one person in place
of another, as purchaser of property, sold under its decree, having a
proper regard to his ability to comply with the terms of sale: Id.
FRAUD. See Debtor and Creditor.
Fraud by two Parties-Evidence.-In an action against two defendants
for fraudulently obtaining the property of the plaintiff, the declaration
alleged that the fraud was a matter of pre-ariangement between them.
The fraud of one of the defendants was not contested, and as to the other
defendant, Held, that his subsequent participation in the fraud and its
fruits was as effective to charge him as preconcert and combination for
its execution. Every act of each in furtherance of the common design
was in contemplation of law the act of both: Lincoln v. laflin et al., 7
Wall.
Where fraud in the purchase or sale of property is in issue, evidence
of other frauds of like character committed by the same parties, at or
near the same time, is admissible: Id.
Where two persons are engaged together in the furtherance of a com-
mon design to defraud others, the -declarations of each relating to the
enterprise are evidence against the other, though made in the latter's
absence: Rd.
Interest is not ailowable as a matter of law, in cases of tort. Its allow-
ance as damages rests in the discretion ofthe jury': Id.
GOVERNIENT CLAIMS. See Arbitration, Revenue Laws.
INTEREST. See Fraud.
Coupons.---Interest warrants or coupons in a negotiable form, draw
interest after payment of them is unjustly neglected or refused: Aurora
v. West, 7 Wall.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Sale of Vessel by Belligerent.-A case in prize heard on "further
proofs," though the transcript disclosed no order for such proofs; it hav-
ing been plain, from both parties having joined in taking them, that
either there was such an order, or that the proofs were taken by consent:
The Georgia, 7 Wall. .
A bondfide purchase for a commercial purpose by a neutral, in his
own home port, of a ship of war of a belligerent that had fled to such
port in order to escape from enemy vessels in pursuit, but which was
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bon6 ftide dismantled prior to the sale and afterwards fitted up for the
merchant service, does not pass a title above the right of capture by the
other belligerent: id.
JUDGMENT.
Estoppel-Res judicata.-A judgment, to operate as* an estoppel,
must be upon the same subject-matter, and between the same parties:
.cKinzie v. B. and 0. Railroad Co., 28 11d.
The term "parties," is not restricted to those who appear as plaintiff
and defendant upon the record; it includes those who are directly
interested in the subject-matter of the suit, knew of its pendeney, and
had the right to control and direct or defend it: Id.
Justice requires that every cause be once fairly and impartially tried;
but the public tranquillity demands that having been once so tried, all
litigation of that question and between the same parties, should be closed
for ever: Id..
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Distrcss-Tcnant's Renedy for an. mnlau!f/l Distress-Property in
hands of Rcceiver.-Wliere a landlord has levied a distress, and taken
thereunder property of sufficient value to satisfy the rent ,then due, he
cannot, without the consent of his tenant or other lawful cause, abandon
his proceedings, and then levy a second distress for the same rent, upon
the same or any other property of his tenant: Everett, Adm. of Tough,
v. Neff 28 Md.
Should a landlord abandon his first distress without justifiable cause,
and levy a second, the tenant's remedy for the taking under the latter,
is trespass, case, or trover: Id.
Where property is rightfully in the hands of a receiver, it is in the
custody of the court, and cannot be distrained upon without the permis-
sion of the court by whom the receiver was appointed: in such case the
landlord must apply to the court for an order on the rceiver to pay the
rent, or for leave to proceed by distress or otherwise: Id.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES.
Contracts fbr Gold Ooin.-A bond given in December, 1851, for
payment of a certain sum in gold and silver coin, lawful money of the
United States, with interest also in coin, at a rate specified, until repay-
ment, cannot be discharged by a tender of United States notes issued
under the Act of Congress of February 25th and two subsequent acts,
and by them declared to be lawful money and a legal tender for the pay-
nent of debts: Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall.
When obligations made payable in coin are sued upon, judgment may
be entered for coined dollars and parts of dollars: I
State Taxes yaable in Gold.-An enactment in a state statute that
"the sheriff shall pay over to the county treasurer the full amount of the
state and school taxes in gold and silver coin " and that "the several county
treasurers shall pay over to the state treasurer the state tax in gold and
silver coin," infers as a legitimate if not a necessary consequence that
the taxes named were required to be collected in cdin. But if in the
judgment of this court, this inference were not a true one, yet the
Supreme Court of the state having held it to be a true one, this court
will follow their adjudication: Lane County, v. Oregon, 7 Wall.
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The clause in the Act of Congress of February 25th 1862, and two
subsequent acts, making notes of United States a legal tender for debts,
has no reference to taxes imposed by state authority: Id.
MANDAMUS.
MYunicipal Corporation-Mandamus to levy Tax.-A return to a
mandamus ordering a municipal corporation forthwith to levy a specific
tax upon the taxable property of a city for the year 1865, sufficient to
pay a judgment specified, collect the tax, and pay the same, or show
cause to the contrary by the next term of the court, is not answered by
a return that the defendants, "in obedience to the order of the court,
did proceed to levy a tax of one per cent. upon the taxable property of
the said city, for the purpose of paying the judgment named in the
information, and other claims, and that the said tax is sufficient in
amount to pay the said judgment and other claims for the payment of
which it was levied." The return should have disclosed the whole act
constituting the levy, so as to enable the court to determine whether it
was sufficient to pay the judgment of the relator. It was also erroneous
in returning that the tax was levied to pay this judgment "and other
claims :" Benbow v. Iowa City, 7 Wall.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law, Mandamus.
NUISANCE.
Suii by Individualfor Public.-An individual cannot maintain a suit
to restrain a nuisance which injures him only in rights enjoyed by him
as one of. the public. In such case, an information must be filed for the
public, in the name of the attorney-general, on behalf of the state; and
it makes no difference as to the remedy, that the individual would be
much more inconvenienced by the nuisance than most others: Higbee v.
The C. & A. R. R. Co., 4 0. E. Green.
But where the injury complained of is the building of a railroad sta-
tion in the street in front of complainant's property, and he owns the
soil in the street upon which it is built, the injury is to his individual
rights, and not as part of the public, aid the suit must be brought in
his own name: Id.
Smnoke, Noise, &c., in Cities.-When the prosecution of a business of
itself lawful, in the neighborhood of a dwelling-house, renders the enjoy-
ment of it materially uncomfortable by the smoke and cinders or noise
or offensive odors produced by such business, although not in any degree
injurious to health, the carrying on such business there is a nuisance,
and will be restrained by injunction: Ross and Others v. Butler, 4 C.
E. Green.
A clear, unmistakable nuisance, which it is iiitended to commit peri-
odically, will not be permitted on the ground that it does not exist the
greater part of the time, but only for a small part of it: Id.
The qualification that a lawful business will not be restrained for
every trifling inconvenience and that persons must not stand on extreme
rights and bring actions in respect to every matter of annoyance, does
not refer to the proportion of time for which the nuisance is continued,
but only to the degree or kind of annoyance: Id.
Matters that are an annoyance by being merely disagreeable or un-
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i*hth. as a well-kept butcher shop, or a green grocer, near a costly
d a ,!lin,-house, or any other business that attracts crowds of orderly
per~on , or numbers of carts and carriages, although very undesirable
ieighbri, are not nuisances, even should they seriously affect the value
of the property by driving away tenants, and prevent it being let to any
who would pay high rents: Md.
B ecause a certain part of a town is occupied by tradesmen and me-
,lranics for residences and carrying on trades which occasion some degree
ot noise, smoke and cinders, and contains no elegant or costly dwellings,
and is not inhabited by the wealthy and luxurious, it is not therefore a
,,o~er and convenient place for carrying on a business which renders
the dwellings there uncomfortable to the owners and their families by
offensive smells, smoke, cinders, or intolerable noises: Id.
A dense smoke laden with cinders (caused by the burning of pine
wood) and continued for twelve hours twice in each month, falling upon
and penetrating houses and premises at distances varying from forty to
two hundred feet, held to cause such injury, annoyance and discomfort
as to constitute a legal nuisance: .RT.
PARTNERSHIP.
Compensation to Agent by Share of Profits.-A participation in the
profits of any business or undertaking, to constitute one a partner, must
be a general participation in the profits as such. A person who is not a
principal, has no control of the business, and no power as a partner in
the firm, but who is employed as a superintendent or agent, receiving
by way of compensation for his services a certain share of the profits, is
not thereby a partner: Hargrave v. Conroy, 4 0 . E. Green.
Such relation does not, as between the parties, constitute them part-
ners, and generally does not as to strangers. If the profits are so greatly
out of proportion to the services rendered as to show that the arrange-
ment is a shift to avoid responsibility, and that creditors are injured by
the abstraction of so large a part of the avails of the business, it will be
held, as to them, that such person is a partner: Id.
But where a party agrees to serve another for a part of the profits to
be derived from the business, but they are by the express terms of the
agreement to be paid for his services, he cannot call for an account as
partner, but he has a right to an account of the profits, and to the aid
of this court in discovery and taking an account of profits: Id.
Where a party under a contract to perform a certain work at a certain
rate, has performed part, and the performance of the residue was pre-
vented without the fault of either party, he is entitled to payment in
proportion, at the rate agreed upon for the whole:.Id.
PATENT.
New Substance from Combination of known Hateials.-When a
patent is claimed for a discovery of a new substance by means of chemi-
cal combinations of known materials, it should state the component parts
of the new manufacture claimed with clearness and precision, and not
leave the person attempting to use the discovery.to find it out "by
experiment :" Tyler v. City of Boston, 7 Wall.
The term " equivalent," when used with regard to the chemical action
of such fluids as can be discovered only by experiment, only means
equally good: Id.
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Whether one compound of given proportions is substantially the same
as another compound, varying the proportions, is a question of fact and
for the jury: Id.
PLEADING.
Rul s-Practice-Res Judicata.-In a case having long and compli-
cated pleadings, where a second count of a declaration has been left by
the withdrawal of a plea without an answer, so that judgment might
have been had on it by nil dicit, a superior court will not, on error,
infer, as of necessity, that a judgment below for the plaintiff was thus
given; the case being one where after such withdrawal there were
numerous demurrers, pleas, replications, and rejoinder, arising from a
first count, and the proceedings showing that these were the subject of
controversy. The second count will be taken to be waived: Aurora
0 'Cj v. West, 7 Wall.
A reversal in a court of last resort, remanding a case, cannot be set
up as a bar to a judgment in an inferior court on the same case : Id.
The i:ule that judgment will be given against the party who commits
the first fault in pleading does not apply to faults of mere form: Id.
The plea of res judicata applies to every objection urged in a second
suit, when the same objection was open to the party within the legitimate
scope of the pleadings in a former one, and might have been presented
in it: Id.
PRIZE. See International Law.
PUBLIC LANDS.
Meandered Streams-Rights of Riparian Proprietor.-The meander
lines run in surveying fractional portions of the public lands bordering
upon navigable rivers, are run not as boundaries of the tract, but for the
purpose of defining the sinuosities of the banks of the stream, and as
the means of ascertaining the quantity of the land in the fraction, and
which is to be paid for by the purchaser: Railroad Co. v. Shurmeir, 7
Wall.
Congress in providing, as it does in one or more acts relating to the
survey and sale of public lands bordering upon rivers-that navigable
rivers, within the territory to be surveyed, should be deemed to be pub-
lic highways, and that where the opposite banks of any stream, not
navigable, should belong to different persons, the stream and the bed
thereof should become common to both-meant to enact that the com-
mon-law rules of riparian ownership should apply in the latter case, but
that the title to lands bordering on navigable streams should stop at the
stream and not come to the medium filum : Id.
But such riparian proprietors have the same right to construct suit-
able landings. and wharfs, for the convenience of commerce and naviga-
tion, as riparian proprietors on navigable waters affected by the ebb and
flow of the tide: Id.
A government grant of land in Minnesota (9.28 acres) bounded on
one side by the Mississilpi, was held to include a parcel (2.78 acres)
four feet lower than the main body, and which at very low water was
separated from it by a slough or channel 28 feet wide through which no
water flowed but in which water remained in pools; where at medium
water it flowed through the depression, making an island of the parcel;
and where at high water the parcel was submerged; the whole place
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
having previous to the controversy been laid out as a city, and the muni-
cipal authorities having graded and filled up the place to the river edge
of the parcel: Id.
If by the laws in force in Minnesota in 1859, the recording of a town
or city plot indicating a dedication for a public purpose of certain parts
of the land laid out, operated as a conveyance in fee to the town or city,
yet it could operate only as a conveyance of the fee subject to the pur-
pose indicated by the dedication, and subject to that it must be held by
any future claimant: Id.
RECEIVER. See Debtor and Creditor, Landlord and Tenant.
REVENUE LAws.
Duties paid under protest-Jurisdiction of Court of Claims.-Under
the Act of Congress of February 26th 1845, relative to the recovery of
duties paid under protest, a written protest signed by the party, with a
statement of the definite grounds of objection to the duties demanded
and paid, is a condition precedent to a right to sue in any court for their
recovery: Nichols v.- United States, 7 Wall.
Cases arising under the revenue laws are not within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Jurisdiction- Practice.-If it is apparent from the record that this
court has not acquired jurisdiction of a case for want of proper appeal or
writ of error, it will be dismissed although neither.party ask it: Edmon-
son v. Bloomslire, 7 Wall.
An appeal or writ of error which does not bring to this court a tran-
script of the record before the expiration of the term to which it is
returnable, is no longer a valid appeal or writ: Id.
Although a prayer for an appeal, and its allowance by the court below,
constitute a valid appeal though no bond be given (the bond being to
be given with effect at any time while the appeal is in force), yet if no
transcript is filed in this court at the term next succeeding the allow-
ance of the appeal, it has lost its vitality as an appeal: Id.
Such vitality cannot be restored by an order of the Circuit Court made
afterwards, accepting a bond made to perfect that appeal. Nor does a
recital in the citation, issued after such order, that the appeal was taken
as of that date, revive the defunct appeal or constitute a new one: Id.
WILL.
Testamentary Conrpetency- Undue Tkfluence.-The law concedes to a
man of sound mind the right to dispose of his property in any manner
he may deem proper consistent with its policy; and it is no valid objec-
tion to a will that the testator gave his property to his wife, or to stran-
gers to his blood, provided he was mentally competent, and was free from
undue influence at the time: Hfiggins et al. v. Carlton, 28 1id.
It is not sufficient to avoid a will, that its dispositions are imprudent
and unaccountable: Id.
The influence to vitiate a will, must be an unlawful influence, and
exerted to such a degree as to amount to force or coercion, destroying
